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Abstract 
The civil war in Syria, which started in March of 2011, has led to a massive influx of forced migration, 
especially from the Northern Syria to the neighbouring countries. The unexpected movement of 
refugees has created large exogenous labour supply shocks with potential significant effects on the 
labour and living standard outcomes of natives in the host countries. While earlier studies have 
explored the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on the natives’ labour outcomes little is known about 
its impact in Egypt. Furthermore, the literature does not provide evidence about the impact of the 
Syrian refugee inflows on the labour outcomes of migrants who have been relocated in the host 
countries before the refugee crisis. Using a difference-in-differences (DID) framework this study 
explores the impact of Syrian refugees on labour outcomes in Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. Furthermore, 
we implement an instrumental variables (IV) approach within the DID framework, where we 
instrument the Syrian population at the area-governorate level of the host country with variables that 
incorporate physical travel distances. The results are mixed and vary, not only across the labour 
outcomes explored, but also across demographic and socio-economic groups, as females and low 
educated are mostly affected by the refugee crisis negatively. However, the effects, positive or 
negative, are rather negligible.  
Keywords: Difference-in-Differences; Forced Migration; Formal Employment; Labour Market; 
Instrumental Variables; Living Standards and Wealth; Syrian Refugees; Wages; Unemployment. 




1. Introduction  
Forced migration and refugees pose political, moral, socio-cultural and economic challenges for the 
host countries (Card et al., 2005). According to the UNHCR (2019a), the scale of this challenge is 
larger than ever, with almost 79.5 million people forcibly displaced worldwide by conflicts. The civil 
war in Syria has produced more refugees than any other conflict in the past two decades. As by the 
end of 2019, in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt only, there were almost 5.3 million refugees 
coming from Syria, with around 3.5 million located in Turkey; around 914,000 in Lebanon followed 
by Egypt, Jordan and Iraq ranging between 130 and 660 thousands.3  
 
The economic theory assumes that immigration and large refugee inflows may cause an outward shift 
in the labour supply, as the pool of workers in certain sectors and industries increases. On the other 
hand, migration may increase also the demand for labour, as migrants expand the demand for certain 
goods and services. In case the labour supply increases more, the native workers are replaced by the 
immigrants, resulting to lower employment rates and wages. Nevertheless, this will depend on various 
factors, as whether the refugees are perfect substitutes or complements to natives in the production 
process.  
 
The previous literature reports mixed results, as a number of studies found negligible effects of 
migration on natives’ wages and employment (Altonji and Card, 1991; Gang and Rivera-Batiz, 1994; 
Pischke and Velling, 1997). One explanation is that migrant workers are complements or poor 
substitutes for native workers, at least in the short run, as the human capital stocks of immigrants are 
not instantly transferable to the host economy, thus, if there is any effect, this would become apparent 
in the long-term period. On the other hand, other studies found a negative impact of migration flows 
on natives’ employment and wage rates arguing that migrant workers are actually substitutes to the 
natives, and especially for those belonging to the lower levels of the wage distribution (Card, 2001). 
However, these studies have explored the impact of voluntary and regular migration on labour 
outcomes, while our study aims to investigate the impact of forced migration, such as the Syrian 
refugee crisis. Thus, this brings up the question on whether the impact of forced and displaced migrants 
on the labour outcomes in the host countries differ from the findings in the previous literature that 
investigate mainly the impact of regular migration.  
 
Following the discussion so far, the main objective of this study is to explore the impact of Syrian 
refugee influx on labour outcomes in Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. Moreover, we explore the impact of 
the Syrian refugees on labour outcomes of both natives and migrants in Jordan and Turkey, but not in 
Egypt, due to data unavailability. The motivation on exploring also the impact on migrants’ well-being 
outcomes lies in earlier studies that mainly focus on natives4. The analysis will also take place across 
gender, age and education groups, while we will investigate and compare the impact of the Syrian 
                                                             
3 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria 
4 Even though, a large influx of Syrian refugees has been recorded in Lebanon, due to data unavailability we will not 





refugee crisis on wages and job security across those employed in the formal and informal sector, as 
well as, those employed in high and low-skilled jobs. The aim is to further explore whether natives 
and migrants are displaced in the formal or informal sector by the refugees and whether are displaced 
mainly in low-skilled or high-skilled jobs. We assume that refugees can be either substitutes for one 
group of workers, but complements to another group, and thus, we explore the impact of the refugee 
crisis on natives and migrants by their education level and the job skills. The results vary between 
countries and across the labour outcomes explored, as well as, across various demographic and socio-
economic groups. 
 
The remaining sections are organised as follows: In section 2 we discuss the earlier literature on the 
impact of the refugee inflows on labour outcomes.  In section 3 we present the methodology applied 
and we describe the data employed in the empirical work. In section 4 we report the main findings and 
in section 5 we discuss the main concluding remarks and policy implications of the migration effect. 
 
2. Literature Review   
A number of studies have explored the impact of refugees on labour outcomes of native populations. 
The most similar studies to our paper is by Del Carpio and Wagner (2015), Tumen (2018), and Fallah 
et al. (2019). Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) using the Turkish Household Labour Force Survey 
(HLFS) implemented a similar identification strategy to explore the impact on employment. The study 
suggests that Syrian forced migration had a large-scale displacement in the informal sector for native 
people, while on the contrary formal employment of natives noted a significant increase. In particular, 
for every 10 refugees almost 7 Turkish workers are displaced in the informal sector, while for the same 
number of refugees, around 4 jobs in the formal sector for the natives are created. Ceritoglu et al. 
(2017) also found a negative impact of the Syrian migrant influx on natives’ labour outcomes in 
Turkey, such as rising unemployment and decline in the labour force participation. In a similar fashion, 
Fallah et al. (2019) explored the impact of Syrian refugees on labour outcomes in Jordan employing a 
DID technique. To further solve for the endogeneity coming from the “sorting” process which 
characterizes the refugees’ decision to relocate in certain areas, the authors instrument for the locality 
share of refugees based on the distance to the locality from the Zaatari refugee camp; Jordan’s largest 
camp. Overall, the study shows no deterioration in the natives’ labour outcomes.  
 
These findings are supported from studies using similar identification strategies, such as the DID 
comparing areas with low and high number of refugees, and investigating the impact of forced 
migration in other regions and countries of the world. For instance, Kreibaum (2016) explored the 
impact of Congolese refugees on natives in Uganda and they found that refugee inflows increase 
educational attainment, employment opportunities and household welfare, measured by the household 
expenditures. However, natives are less likely to use health facilities due to congestion caused by the 
increasing number of refugee inflows. Furthermore, some vulnerable groups, such as low skilled 
workers, are displaced in terms of employment, as they are directly forced into competition with the 
refugees, indicating that refugees are substitutes to those natives in the production process. Borjas and 




crises on native populations. In particular, they explore the Balkan refugees following the Yugoslav 
wars between 1991-2001; the Algerian refugees resulted from the Algerian independence war in 1962; 
the Soviet refugees in Israel in 1990 and the “Marielitos” who fled from the port of Mariel in Cuba in 
1980 and the destination was Miami. Using a DID framework their findings are mixed as they found 
a negative impact on the low-skilled workers in the case of the Algerian refugees in France and the 
Marielitos in Miami, while a negative effect on wages and employment is found in the high-skilled 
Israelis competing with large numbers of high-skill Soviet migrants.  
 
This study attempts to contribute to the earlier literature by several ways. First, there is no study 
investigating the impact of Syrian refugees on both natives’ and migrant’s labour outcomes in Jordan 
and Turkey. Second, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study exploring the impact of Syrian 
refugee crisis in Egypt, where there are no refugee camps, but most Syrian refugees live in 
overcrowded and poor neighbourhoods of cities (Montaser, 2020).  Third, we expand our analysis by 
decomposing and investigating the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on labour outcomes across 
gender, age and education groups, as well as, across formal and informal sector employment and high 
versus low skilled jobs.  
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Difference-in-Differences (DID) Framework and Instrumental Variables (IV)  
The empirical set up for our analysis is based on a DID framework. More specifically, following the 
studies by Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) and Tumen (2018) we estimate the following DID model: 
 
	𝐸#$% = 𝑎( + 𝑎*(𝑇#$ × 𝑃#%) + 𝑎′𝐗#$% + 𝑙$ + 𝜃% + 𝜀#$%                                                                          (1)  
                              
Where 	𝐸#$% is the outcome of main interest for individual i, in region-governorate r and year t. 𝑇#$ 
takes a value of 1 for the treated group and 0 for the control, while 𝑃#% takes a value of 1 for the year 
2012 and after, where the Syrian refugee influx started taking place and 0 for the years before 2012.   
 
We should notice that while the civil war started in 2011 the inflows mainly started in 2012, especially 
in Turkey and Egypt (Cagaptay and Menekse, 2014)  Furthermore, we prefer to consider the impact 
of the refugee crisis by considering one-year lagged inflows, since the surveys take place in the spring 
of each year. We explore five labour outcomes: employment in the formal sector; wages; 
unemployment; labour force participation; and the contract type, and in particular, permanent versus 
temporary job. All the labour outcomes are dummy variables taking a value of 1 whether the 
respondent is employed; participates in the labour market or she is employed under a temporary 
contract and 0 otherwise, while wages is a continuous variable expressed in 2012 real prices. The 
interaction term of 𝑇#$	and 𝑃#% and the etimated coefficient 𝑎* is the DID estimator, which gives the 





Vector 𝐗#$%  is a vector of individual and household characteristics. The control variables for Egypt 
and Jordan are common and they include gender, age, education level, marital status, household size, 
and parental characteristics, such as education and employment status. Furthermore, in the case of 
labour outcomes, except for unemployment, we include the firm size, the professional class according 
to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO88) and the industry code. For 
Turkey we use the same controls except for the parental characteristics because these are not recorded 
in the HLFS. Sets lr and θt are respectively the region-governorate and year fixed effects.  
 
The next step for the identification strategy discussed so far is to present the “treated” and “control” 
groups.  In particular, in figures 1-3 and table 1 we illustrate the treated-control areas in the three 
countries we explore. According to table 1 and figure 1, for Egypt we will consider areas-governorates 
with high percentage of Syrian migration population, such as Cairo, Giza, Alexandria, Damietta, 
Sharkia and Kalyoubia, as the treated groups, while the rest of the governorates are defined as control 
areas.  The next country of interest is Jordan. Based on figure 2 and the reports by UNHCR5, the 
governorates of Amman, Zarqa, Balqa , Irbid, and Mafraq will form the treated group. The remained 
of the governorates presented in table 1 and illustrated in figure 2 will comprise the control group.  
 
In table 1 and figure 3 we present the treated-control groups for Turkey mapped at the Nomenclature 
of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) 2 level. The control area corresponds to the Eastern Anatolia, 
which is exactly specified and defined as the Northeast Anatolia (Kuzey Doğu Anadolu) coded as TRA 
and the Middle East Anatolia (Orta Doğu Anadolu) coded as TRB, while the treated group-area 
corresponds exactly to the southeastern Anatolia NUTS 1 level (Güney Doğu Anadolu) coded as TRC. 
 
While Adana and Hatay have also received a considerable number of Syrian refugees, and are included 
in the western parts of the dark gray shaded areas in figure 3, we will exclude them from the analysis. 
The main justification of doing this is that these provinces belong to the Mediterranean region, which 
includes also the provinces of Mersin and Antalya, two large provinces that have received a trivial 
number of refugees from Syria and their inclusion will most likely pose a threat our identification. 
Furthermore, these provinces present large differences in terms of both economic, demographic and 
socio-cultural characteristics. Additionally, we will test the parallel trend assumption (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2008; Autor, 2003). 
 
The second specification model is to take the logarithm of the population of Syrian refugees in the host 
areas-governorates and to employ an IV approach within the DID framework using the Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) method. The instrument is similar to earlier studies (Del Carpio and Wagner, 
2015; Tumen, 2018) and is based on the distance from the source governorates in Syria to destination 
provinces in Turkey and Egypt, while in Jordan we will use additionally the distance between the 
refugee camps and the respondent’s governorate. The instrument is: 










𝑃<𝑅%                                                                                                                             (2)    
                            
In instrument (2), Dsr is the shortest travel distance from a Syrian governorate s to each area-
governorate r in the countries we explore. We apply the Haversine formula instead of the Euclidean 
distance, as the first accounts for the great-circle distance along the surface of the Earth (Sinnott,1984).  
 
In relation (2) we get the inverse distance weighting that gives more weight to closer points. This 
applies to all countries; however, in the cases of Jordan we include also the distance between the 
refugee camps and the centroid of the Jordanian governorates. We consider the governorates in Egypt 
and Jordan and the areas at NUTS 2 level for Turkey in table 1. For example, in Turkey and the NUTS-
2 level we have 7 areas and 13 Syrian governorates, which implies 91 pairs (7×13). Similarly, for 
Egypt we have 286 pairs and 195 pairs for Jordan that includes also three refugee camps; the Zaatari, 
Mrajeeb Al Fhood and Azraq. Syrian refugees in Egypt and Jordan originate mainly from Damascus 
and its rural suburbs, followed by those coming from the governorates of Aleppo, Homs and Daraa. 
On the other hand, Turkey has hosted almost the 90 percent of Syrian refugees coming from the 
governorates of Aleppo, Al-Raqqah, Hamah, Lattakia, Idlib, Al-Hassakeh that are located in the 
borders with Turkey. Nevertheless, we will take the distance and population statistics of all 13 
governorates of Syria. Hence, Ps in relation (2) denotes the population of each Syrian governorate in 
2010 prior to the civil war and Rt is the proportion of the Syrian refugees over the total population in 
the host country corresponding to one year before the interview. As we have shown in table 2, there 
have been very few Syrians before 2012, both regular migrants and refugees, across the three countries 
we explore. Hence, this measure captures the variation in the cross-locality in the share of Syrian 
refugees and migrants, possibly due to the Syrian civil war of 2011. Peri (2012) and Black et al. (2015) 
used this instrument to explore voluntary migration, while Baez (2011) and Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 
(2015) have employed this instrument to explore the impact of 500,000 refugee inflows resulted by 
the genocides of Burundi and Rwanda and fled in Kagera- a region in northwestern Tanzania. 
Following the discussion so far, estimate the following regression using the 2SLS method: 
 
	𝐸#$% = 𝑏( + 𝑏*𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑃$% + 𝑏′𝐗#$% + 𝑙$ + 𝜃% + 𝜀#$%                                                                                 (3)                               
 
Where the variables and vector X are defined as in (1), while 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑃$% denotes the logarithm of the 
Syrian migrant population instrumented with the variables mentioned above. In both regressions (1) 
and (3), standard errors are clustered at the regional-governorate level combined with wild 
bootstrapping.  
 
3.2 Threats to the Identification Strategy 
A major threat to our identification strategy can be the fact that the Syrian refugees may tend to migrate 




have used the past values of migration flows arguing that historical settlement patterns of immigrants 
may drive the migrants’ location decisions (Bartel, 1989; Altonji and Card, 1991). Hence, migrants 
tend to migrate into areas with a strong presence of diaspora, where previous generations or migrant 
flows have built immigrant enclaves, sharing common cultural and social characteristics (Bartel, 1989; 
Beine et al., 2011). These diasporas may also reduce assimilation and information costs for the 
migrants, providing support with housing, employment, and adjusting to cultural issues and social 
norms (Beine et al., 2011). However, as we show in table 2 the number of refugees and regular migrants 
from Syria before the civil war is significantly lower compared with the numbers that have reached 
following the refugee crisis. We present the total number of refugees and regular Syrian migrants to 
highlight that even though the Syrian refugees may tend to locate in areas with large established Syrian 
enclaves, the low number of regular migrants before the crisis does not pose a particular threat to our 
estimates. Furthermore, until 2013-2014 Syrian refugees were mainly located in camps in Turkey 
(Esen and Binatlı, 2017). Moreover, the largest number of Syrian migrants before the refugee crisis 
and also a large movement of Syrian refugees after the crisis took place in Istanbul which is not 
included in the analysis, as other major metropolitan areas-cities, including Izmir and Bursa.  
 
Similarly, another key threat to the validity of the instrument employed in the analysis, is that areas 
that are located close to a border in the case of Turkey, or areas close to the refugee camps, may 
systematically differ from those that are further away. While we could control for the physical distance 
only, our instrument incorporates multiple border-crossings between Syria and Turkey and multiple 
origins-destinations in the case of Egypt and Jordan, including also the refugee camps in Jordan. Thus, 
refugees from Syrian governorates will use also different border crossings to reach different parts in 
the host countries, allowing us to directly control for the distance from the borders. In particular, there 
are two main crossings, Alexandria and Cairo, to reach different parts in Egypt, and to a lesser degree 
other crossings include the seaports, and in particularly Nuweiba. In Jordan there are two main border 
crossings in Dar’a/Ramtha and Naseeb/Jaber and many other unofficial crossings. In Turkey there 
were 8 border crossings, however, after 2013, five of them were closed6.   
 
Another possible drawback in our estimates is the fact that Turkey has signed an agreement with the 
European Union in 2016 on the exchange of refugees and thus, migrants may choose Turkey as a 
transit country to Europe using the Balkan or the Aegean route. However, our empirical analysis for 
Turkey is based on data derived up to 2013. Furthermore, the evidence shows that refugees use also 
Jordan and Egypt as transit countries to Europe using the Mediterranean route (Brian and Laczko, 
2016; Baklacioğlu, 2017).  
 
A final threat to our identification strategy could be the employment policies implemented in Jordan 
providing work permit to the Syrian refugees, implying that will motivate them to stay in the country, 
in contrast to Turkey, where the refugees may use it as a transit country. Nonetheless, slightly fewer 
than 40,000 valid work permits have been issued to them until May 2017 (Livelihoods Working Group, 
                                                             




2017; Lenner and Turner, 2019), which is after the period of the empirical analysis in this study, 
indicating that our estimates could still be robust.  
 
3.3 Data   
For the empirical analysis we will derive data from various surveys. In particular, we will use the 
Integrated Labor Market Panel Surveys (ILMPS) for Egypt in 2006, 2012 and 2018 and for Jordan in 
2010 and 2016.  For Turkey, we will use the cross-sectional Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) 
over the period 2009-2013.  The ILMPS is provided by the ERF NADA data portal (OAMDI, 2019), 
while the HLFS in Turkey is provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). The 
population of Syrian governorates can be found at the Central Bureau of Statistics (http://cbssyr.sy/).  
The population of Syrian migration in Egypt and Jordan has been derived from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Jordan Population and Housing Census from the 
Department of Statistics, and the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). 
For Turkey, the data can be found at the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM 
https://en.goc.gov.tr/). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Egypt 
In table 3 we report the DID and DID-IV 2SLS estimates for Egypt. One major limitation of the 
estimates is that we cannot distinguish about whether the respondent is native or immigrant, as we are 
able to do in the cases of Jordan and Turkey. Based on the DID estimator we find no impact of the 
Syrian refugee crisis on wages, the probability of being employed in the formal sector under a 
permanent contract, while a reduction in unemployment is found at 0.41 percent based on the DID-IV 
estimates. We should recall that the dependent variable unemployment takes a value of 1 if the 
respondent is unemployed and 0 otherwise, thus, we may conclude that migration increases the 
probability for the respondent of being employed. On the other hand, the results show that refugees 
reduce the labour force participation. To test for the parallel trend assumption, we will apply the leads 
and lags test (see Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Abraham and Sun, 2018 for more details): 
 
                                                                                                   (4) 
 
Where Dit is an indicator showing whether the treatment-policy (Syrian migration) is switched on in 
year t, and the leads and lags of the treatment are expressed respectively by s and q. The coefficients 
of leads should be insignificant, and given the period of our analysis for Egypt we have only 1 lag and 
no lead period, while for Turkey we will consider 2 lags and 2 leads. Regarding Jordan, we cannot 
implement this test, since we have only two years in our empirical analysis, in 2010 and 2016, and 
thus, we cannot test the parallel trend assumption and the validity of the DID model. In all cases, based 
on the leads and lags test we accept the null hypothesis, indicating that the parallel trend assumption 










Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic weak instrument test and its associated p-values, we reject the null 
hypothesis, concluding that the instrument is valid. Based on the Hansen J test, we also accept the null 
hypothesis, implying that the instrument employed is exogenous.  
 
Overall, the impact either positive or negative is very small. For instance, based on the DID-IV 
estimates, one percent increase in the Syrian refugee population is associated with a drop of 0.41 and 
0.49 percent respectively in unemployment and labour force participation. Even though there is no 
research investigating the impact of Syrian migration on labour outcomes in Egypt, our findings 
confirm the findings by Fakih and Ibrahim (2016) and Fallah et (2019) who found trivial impact of 
migration on labour outcomes, such as employment and wages.  
 
To shed more insights about the impact of the refugee crisis, we have repeated the DID and DID-IV 
estimates by demographic and socio-economic groups in table 4. While the benchmark results show 
no impact on formal employment, the results in table 4 show that Syrian refugees have actually a 
detrimental effect on females, low educated, and those aged between 36 and 64. This indicates that 
some groups are not affected at all, while other more vulnerable groups are affected negatively by the 
Syrian refugee crisis. The same applies for the labour force participation, where females, low educated 
and those aged 36-64 are less likely to participate in the labour market. Hence, the results show that 
the refugee crisis may create employment opportunities for those groups, as we can see from the second 
column in table 4, but they are displaced in the informal sector, as we found a negative impact on the 
probability of being employed in the formal sector. Moreover, we find that low educated working in 
the informal sector are negative influenced by Syrian refugees in terms of wages, indicating that 
refugees are mainly substitutes for those groups of workers, resulting to a displacement in terms of 
lower earning potential. Interestingly, males and those employed in high-skilled positions experience 
an increase in their wages, even though modest, due to Syrian refugees.   
 
4.2 Jordan  
In table 5 we report the DID and DID-IV with 2SLS estimates for natives and migrants in Jordan 
Regarding natives, the results are mixed. We find a positive impact on employment and formal 
employment for both natives and migrants in Jordan, but a negative effect is found on the labour force 
participation and the probability of being employed in a permanent position. Furthermore, the refugee 
crisis affects adversely the migrants’ wages. Our results are partly consistent with previous studies that 
found no impact of the Syrian migration on labour outcomes, such as employment and wages (Fakih 
and Ibrahim, 2016; Fallah et al., 2019). In particular, our findings confirm the results by Fallah et al. 
(2019) who found that the impact of Syrian migration had no impact on unemployment, but a positive 
impact on formal employment for Jordanians, suggesting that there was a shift in the type of jobs 
Jordanians do, rather than a loss in employment or job creation. Nevertheless, our results show also a 





However, these studies have not explored the impact on permanent contract, where we found a 
negative, but a small impact of 0.8 and 1.36 percent respectively for the natives and migrants. On the 
contrary, while Fallah et al. (2019) found an insignificant impact on monthly wages, our findings show 
a significant and negative effect for migrants. Thus, our results show that Syrian migration does not 
displace Jordanian workers in terms of unemployment, and increases the probability of being 
employed in the formal sector, but are less likely to participate in the labour market, and are more 
likely to be employed in temporary job positions. Regarding migrants, we find also a negative impact   
of the Syrian refugee crisis on their earning potential in terms of monthly wages.  
 
Our results may differ from earlies studies due to various reasons. First, the study by Fakih and Ibrahim 
(2016) explored the labour outcomes at the aggregate governorate level using a vector autoregressive 
methodology, while Fallah et al. (2019) have instrumented the main endogenous variable-the share of 
Syrian refugees, with the distance between the locality and the Zaatari refugee camp. As we mentioned 
earlier, we instrument, not only with the distance between one refugee camp and the locality, but also 
using the weighted distance between locality and other refugee camps and between the locality and 
the Syrian governorates. The concluding remarks remain the same for the sample of the migrants in 
the ILMS, where the Syrian refugee inflows have a positive impact on formal employment and 
employment, but a negative effect on monthly wages. Moreover, it reduces the probability of labour 
force participation and the employment in a permanent position. 
 
In tables 6-7 we report the DID-IV estimates by gender, education, age, formality and job-skills. As 
high education we define those who have completed the high school and upper, as the majority of the 
respondents explored in these countries have completed an educational attainment up to a secondary 
school ranging between 75-80 percent. As high skilled persons we consider those who are managers; 
technicians and associated professionals; and skilled agricultural workers, while the low-skilled group 
comprises of those who are support workers; working in sales and trade, and are employed in 
elementary occupations. The estimates across natives and migrants share some common 
characteristics. In particular, males, high educated, and those aged between 36-64 are more likely to 
be employed in the formal sector, while there is no effect on low educated and young respondents.  
 
Furthermore, the refugee crisis has a positive effect on the probability of migrants being employed in 
the formal sector for both high and low skilled jobs. Similar conclusions are derived for the 
unemployment, however, we find that low educated migrants and aged 36-64 are more likely to be 
unemployed. Regarding the job security and whether the respondents are employed in a job with a 
permanent contract, we find a negative impact on native males and low educated, but a positive impact 
is found for those employed in the formal sector. On the other hand, migrants are in a more difficult 
position as both formal and informal workers are more likely to be employed in a temporary job. 
Regarding wages, we find no effect except for natives working in low-skilled jobs and are negatively 
affected, while on the contrary high educated people experience an increase in their monthly wages. 
Migrants, on the other hand, experience a fall in wages, and in particular, males, low educated, young 





Overall, Syrian refugees may increase the formal employment opportunities for both natives and 
migrants, but they displace young, low educated and the informal migrant workers with low skills in 
terms of wages. This indicates that Syrian refugees are substitutes to the migrants and in particular, to 
low educated and low-skilled workers, but complements to the natives and to high educated and high- 
skilled workers. Theoretically, we could expect that lower wages in the informal sector may result to 
substitution from formal to informal workers. However, we found a positive impact on the formal 
employment for both native and migrants, which could be attributed to the lower production costs that 
expands the output and increase the demand for formal workers. Therefore, natives in Jordan could 
take advantage of the low costs of Syrian refugee labour that creates new jobs. Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that the Syrian refugee influx has created many low-skilled jobs that could have been available 
to Jordanians. This is especially the case of low educated, low-skilled and youth with no working 
experience, who have to compete with refugees who are willing to accept considerably lower wages 
(Stave and Hillesund, 2015). 
 
4.3 Turkey 
In table 8 we report the DID and DID-IV estimates for natives and migrants in Turkey. We should not 
that we report only the coefficient of main interest, which is the DID estimator.  We observe that Syrian 
refugees had a positive impact on the labour outcomes of natives explored. On the other hand, we find 
no impact on the labour outcomes of migrants, and in particular, the unemployment and labour force 
participation, but the Syrian refugee crisis increases the probability for the migrants to be employed in 
the informal sector under temporary contracts, experiencing lower earnings. Thus, we conclude that 
Syrian refugees displace the migrants, but create more employment opportunities and higher earning 
potential for the natives. Our results are consistent with the study Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) and 
Aksu et al., (2018) who found that formal employment of Turkish natives noted a significant increase 
due to Syrian refugee inflows, but a negative impact is found for those employed in the informal sector.  
 
In tables 9-10 we report the DID-IV 2SLS estimates respectively for the natives and migrants in Turkey 
across the demographic and socio-economic groups we presented in the previous tables for Egypt and 
Jordan. The results are heterogeneous, as we find a positive impact on employment opportunities in 
the formal sector under permanent positions for males, while women are more likely to be employed 
in temporary positions. Furthermore, the impact on labour force participation and annual wages is 
higher in the sample of males. A similar conclusion is derived by the analysis across education groups, 
where high educated individuals are more likely to be employed in permanent positions in the formal 
sector, while low educated respondents are negatively influenced by the Syrian refugee crisis in terms 
of job security and formal employment. Both high and low-skilled natives, as well as, both high and 
low-educated workers experience an increase in their annual wages, where the impact is almost 
doubled for the high-skilled and high-educated workers.  Overall, even though the Syrian refugees 
have a positive impact on natives’ labour outcomes in Turkey, based on the results of table 8, women, 
young and low educated are negatively affected by the refugee crisis, as respondents belonging to these 





The results in table 10 confirm the negative impact of the Syrian refugees on the labour outcomes of 
migrants in Turkey. The effect is stronger for females, low educated, and young, indicating the large 
discrepancies across those groups. Furthermore, while we found a negative impact on formal 
employment, those aged 36-64 are more likely to have social security, while no significant impact is 
found on the permanent contract, unemployment, labour force participation and wages for high 
educated individuals. Moreover, migrants employed in the informal sector are more likely to work 
under temporary contracts. When we decompose our analysis by high and low-skilled migrants, we 
find a significant and positive impact on formal employment, due to the refugee crisis, only for the 
high-skilled workers, while a negative and significant probability for being employed under a 
permanent contract is found for the low-skilled workers. Regarding wages, the refugee crisis has a 
negative and significant impact on both low and high-skilled migrants, with the former group 
experiencing a larger fall. However, the impact is rather negligible, where a 1 percent increase in the 
Syrian refugee population is associated with a decline of wages ranging around 0.05 and 0.09 
percentage points.   
 
5. Conclusions  
This study has attempted to estimate the impact of the Syrian refugee influx on labour outcomes in 
Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. The results are mixed, and vary by country, labour outcomes, migrant status 
and socio-economic groups. In particular, while we found no impact of the Syrian refugees on formal 
employment and wages in Egypt, the effect becomes significant and negative for the low-skilled and 
low-educated workers, indicating the substitutability of refugees to those particular groups of workers. 
The same applies for Jordan, where the refugee crisis has created employment opportunities in the 
formal sector for both natives and migrants, but under temporary contracts, and associated with lower 
wages for the migrants. Regarding Turkey, the results show that natives located in areas that host most 
of the Syrian refugees, experience higher employment and wage rates, in contrast to migrants that 
report lower levels of wages and more unfavourable labour market conditions. Nevertheless, the 
inequalities in the three countries explored, are persistent in the most vulnerable groups, such as 
females, low educated and employed in low-skilled jobs.  
 
However, the study is not without drawbacks. The first limitation is that we employ cross-sectional 
surveys and we cannot follow the same individuals across time to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
and omitted-variable bias. Second, due to information recorded in the HLFS in Turkey, we have limited 
the analysis to the period 2009-2013. The issue is that the majority of the Syrian refugees were located 
in camps up to 2013, while the following years were able to move across Turkey and relocate in other 
areas outside camps. This most likely have a significant impact on the labour outcomes explored, 
implying that our findings may underestimate the impact, positive or negative, of the Syrian refugees. 
For instance, while we find a positive impact on the formal employment and wages of natives, the 
effect can be lower or even reversed in some areas that host large number of Syrians. Thus, HLFS and 




migrant status. This can be expanded into an analysis where, not only first generation migrants, but 
also second and higher generations of migrants can be considered. 
 
Future studies may exploit similar identification strategies to explore the effect of forced migration on 
subjective well-being, such as life satisfaction, happiness, psychological well-being and mental health, 
as well as, on cultural, social values and norms in the MENA region countries. Therefore, further 
research is needed to understand a more complete picture of the Syrian refugee crisis and its impact 
on the local population and economies in the countries we explored, but also in other countries affected 
by the crisis, including Lebanon, Iraq and European countries. Furthermore, further analysis to better 
understand the long term effects of the refugee crisis on various economic, demographic and socio-
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Figure 1. Proportion of Syrian Households by Governorate in Egypt, 2017 
 
Source: UNHCR (2019b)  
 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of Syrian Households by Governorate in Jordan, 2015 
 















































Table 1: Treated and Control Areas-Governorates 
Panel A:Egypt Panel B:Jordan Panel C: Turkey 
Treated Control Control Treated Control Treated Control  
Cairo Port-Said Behera Amman Madaba TRC1 TRA1  
Alexandria Suez Ismailia Zarqa Jarash TRC2 TRA2  
Damietta Dakahlia Beni-Suef Balqa Ajloun TRC3 TRB1  
Sharkia Kafr-
Elsheikh 
Fayoum Irbid Karak  TRB2  
Kalyoubia Gharbia Menia Mafraq Tafileh    
Giza Menoufia Asyout  Ma'an    
 Suhag Qena  Aqaba    




Table 2. Averages of Syrian Refugees and Regular Migrants 
Egypt Total 
2006 4,500 







Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Department of Statistics  
(Jordan) http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_e/main/population/census2004/index.htm and Central Agency for  
Public Mobilization and Statistics  https://www.capmas.gov.eg/HomePage.aspx for Egypt and Jordan;  



























Table 3. DID and DID-IV Estimates for Egypt 











































No. Observations 41,960 88,216 48,652 113,803 25,904 
R-square 0.8494 0.0485 0.5278 0.4505 0.1530 






































No. Observations 29,804 64,576 29,992 84,546 20,445 



























Wild Bootstrap Combined with Regional-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parenthesis, P-values within brackets, ***, 





























Table 4. DID-IV Estimates for Egypt Across Groups 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  












No. Observations 24,329 31,799 24,482 42,259 16,948 
Centered R-square 0.8278 0.0280 0.5544 0.5582 0.1177 
Female      












No. Observations 5,475 32,777 5,510 42,287 3,497 
Centered R-square 0.9168 0.0597 0.2673 0.1978 0.2513 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  












No. Observations 6,974 11,085 7,060 11,159 5,566 
Centered R-square 0.8153 0.0993 0.3170 0.1904 0.2168 
Low Education      












No. Observations 22,830 53,491 22,932 73,387 14,879 
Centered R-square 0.8226 0.0108 0.4799 0.4449 0.0755 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  












No. Observations 15,219 38,565 15,454 48,065 11,367 
Centered R-square 0.8717 0.0495 0.4799 0.4628 0.1088 
Age 36-64      












No. Observations 14,585 26,011 14,538 36,481 9,078 
Centered R-square 0.8173 0.0197 0.5417 0.4725 0.1656 
Formal Sector   DV: Permanent 
Contract  
 DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  
Logarithm of Syrian 
Migrant Population 
  0.0090  
(0.0063) 
 0.0133  
(0.0099) 
No. Observations   11,264  9,836 
Centered R-square   0.2220  0.1619 
Informal Sector      
Logarithm of Syrian 
Migrant Population 
  -0.0075  
(0.0089) 
 -0.0161*  
(0.0086) 
No. Observations   18,540  10,609 
Centered R-square   0.5213  0.0724 
High Skill DV: Formal 
Employment 
 DV: Permanent 
Contract  
 DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  




 -0.0163  
(0.0139) 
 0.0277*  
(0.0135) 
No. Observations 14,416  14,433  8,543 
Centered R-square 0.8702  0.5377  0.2243 
Low Skill      




 -0.0056  
(0.0181) 
 -0.1294  
(0.0995) 
No. Observations 15,388  15.559  11,902 
Centered R-square 0.8255  0.5180  0.0886 
Wild Bootstrap Combined with Regional-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parenthesis, P-values within brackets, ***, 




Table 5. DID and DID-IV Estimates for Natives and Migrants in Jordan 
DID DV: Formal Employment DV: Unemployment 

























No. Observations 10,748 987 30,834 3,364 
R-square 0.8065 0.8738 0.0581 0.0643 
DID-IV DV: Formal Employment DV: Unemployment 
 Natives Migrants Natives Migrants 








No. Observations 10,748 987 30,834 3,364 
Centered R-square 0.8081 0.8917 0.0633 0.0801 
Weak Identification Test: Cragg-Donald 






  [0.000] 
4,492.472 
 [0.000] 








DID DV: Permanent Contract DV: Labour Force Participation 
 Natives Migrants Natives Migrants 
























No. Observations 10,755 987 32,622 3,730 
R-square 0.3707 0.4448 0.3648 0.4091 
DID-IV DV: Permanent Contract DV: Labour Force Participation 
 Natives Migrants Natives Migrants 








No. Observations 10,755 987 32,622 3,730 
Centered R-square 0.3723 0.5696 0.3668 0.4123 
Weak Identification Test: Cragg-Donald 

















   
DID DV: Logarithm of Monthly Wage DID-IV DV: Logarithm of Monthly Wage 




















No. Observations 8,346 863 8,346 863 
R-square 0.2009 0.2098   
Centered R-square   0.2106 0.2374 
Weak Identification Test: Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic 








Wild Bootstrap Combined with Regional-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parenthesis, P-values within brackets, ***, 




Table 6. DID-IV Estimates for Natives in Jordan Across Groups 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  












No. Observations 8,378 15,234 8,382 16,214 6,098 
Centered R-square 0.8011 0.0345 0.3887 0.2331 0.2089 
Female      












No. Observations 2,370 15,600 2,373 16,408 2,248 
Centered R-square 0.8391 0.1136 0.2415 0.3060 0.3065 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  












No. Observations 3,610 7,104 3,612 7,145 3,085 
Centered R-square 0.7581 0.1016 0.1262 0.1521 0.2005 
Low Education      












No. Observations 7,138 23,730 7,143 25,477 5,261 
Centered R-square 0.8106 0.0323 0.4059 0.3752 0.1304 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  












No. Observations 6,405 18,100 6,409 19,100 4,466 
Centered R-square 0.8194 0.0631 0.3337 0.4179 0.2034 
Age 36-64      












No. Observations 4,343 12,734 4,346 13,522 3,880 
Centered R-square 0.7881 0.0210 0.4130 0.4325 0.2088 
Formal Sector   DV: Permanent 
Contract  
 DV: Logarithm of 
Wage  
Logarithm of Syrian 
Migrant Population 
  0.0026  
(0.0082) 
 0.0045  
(0.0084) 
No. Observations   6,011  5,023 
Centered R-square   0.1864  0.1701 
Informal Sector      
Logarithm of Syrian 
Migrant Population 
  -0.0268***  
(0.0073) 
 0.0226***  
(0.0090) 
No. Observations   4,744  3,323 
Centered R-square   0.3863  0.1233 
High Skill DV: Formal 
Employment  
 DV: Permanent 
Contract  
 DV: Logarithm of 
Wage  




 0.0106*  
(0.0054) 
 -0.0038  
(0.0078) 
No. Observations 3,601  3,604  2,638 
Centered R-square 0.7958  0.3365  0.3193 
Low Skill      




 -0.0038  
(0.0078) 
 -0.0234*  
(0.0108) 
No. Observations 7,147  7,151  5,708 
Centered R-square 0.8052  0.3990  0.3990 
Wild Bootstrap Combined with Regional-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parenthesis, P-values within brackets, ***, 






Table 7. DID-IV Estimates for Migrants in Jordan Across Groups 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  












No. Observations 821 1,803 821 2,005 703 
Centered R-square 0.8736 0.0458 0.4431 0.2906 0.2201 
Female      












No. Observations 166 1,561 166 1,725 160 
Centered R-square 0.9803 0.0378 0.9806 0.0982 0.8781 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  












No. Observations 249 420 249 427 212 
Centered R-square 0.8609 0.0943 0.1262 0.3787 0.3808 
Low Education      












No. Observations 738 2,944 738 3,303 651 
Centered R-square 0.8960 0.0647 0.4598 0.3752 0.1459 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  












No. Observations 551 2,098 551 2,297 504 
Centered R-square 0.9059 0.0710 0.4144 0.4302 0.1794 
Age 36-64      












No. Observations 436 1,266 436 1,433 359 
Centered R-square 0.8376 0.0750 0.4939 0.4886 0.2995 
Formal Sector   DV: Permanent 
Contract  
 DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  
Logarithm of Syrian 
Migrant Population 
  -0.0531**  
(0.0260) 
 -0.0257  
(0.0213) 
No. Observations   332  538 
Centered R-square   0.2316  0.2595 
Informal Sector      
Logarithm of Syrian 
Migrant Population 
  -0.0263**  
(0.0119) 
 -0.0300*  
(0.0158) 
No. Observations   655  325 
Centered R-square   0.5011  0.1721 
High Skill DV: Formal 
Employment  
 DV: Permanent 
Contract  
 DV: Logarithm of 
Monthly Wage  




 0.0014  
(0.0013) 
 -0.0317  
(0.0450) 
No. Observations 196  196  141 
Centered R-square 0.9430  0.6613  0.5237 
Low Skill      




 -0.0232**  
(0.0108) 
 -0.0132*  
(0.0071) 
No. Observations 791  791  722 
Centered R-square 0.8631  0.4782  0.4782 
Wild Bootstrap Combined with Regional-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parenthesis, P-values within brackets, ***, 







Table 8. DID and DID-IV Estimates for Natives and Migrants in Turkey 
DID DV: Formal Employment DV: Unemployment 









No. Observations 202,173 542 252,612 796 
R-Square 0.2840 0.5401 0.0273 0.0368 








DID-IV DV: Formal Employment DV: Unemployment 
 Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants 








No. Observations 202,173 542 252,612 796 
Centered R-square 0.2845 0.5473 0.0296 0.0466 
Weak Identification Test: Cragg-Donald 

















DID DV: Permanent Contract DV: Labour Force Participation 









No. Observations 162,721 504 332,386 1,022 
R-Square 0.2246 0.1442 0.3177 0.3181 








DID-IV DV: Permanent Contract DV: Labour Force Participation 
 Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants 








No. Observations 162,721 504 332,386 1,022 
Centered R-square 0.2241 0.1914 0.3346 0.3241 
Weak Identification Test: Cragg-Donald 

















DID DV: Logarithm of Annual Wage DID-IV DV: Logarithm of Annual 
Wage 










No. Observations 152,223 484 152,223 484 
R-Square 0.4538 0.5939   
Centered R-square   0.5026 0.5993 





Weak Identification Test: Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic 








Wild Bootstrap Combined with Regional-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parenthesis, P-values within brackets, ***, 





Table 9. DID-IV Estimates for Natives in Turkey Across Groups 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Annual Wage  












No. Observations 153,868 197,523 118,208 159,546  110,929 
Centered R-square 0.2435 0.344 0.0116 0.0097 0.0776 
Female      












No. Observations 48,305 55,089 44,513 172,840 41,294 
Centered R-square 0.6112 0.0245 0.0298 0.0370 0.0379 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Annual Wage  












No. Observations 57,163 65,693 49,419 75,908 46,513 
Centered R-square 0.0150 0.0165 0.0158 0.0153 0.0532 
Low Education      












No. Observations 145,010 186,919 113,302 256,478 105,710 
Centered R-square 0.0146 0.0080 0.0152 0.3001 0.0151 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Annual Wage  












No. Observations 105,640 184,611 87,273 181,698 83,197 
Centered R-square 0.0188 0.0138 0.0185 0.0117 0.0761 
Age 36-64      












No. Observations 96,533 68,001 75,448 150,688 69,026 
Centered R-square 0.0143 0.0210 0.4130 0.0211 0.0526 
Formal Sector   DV: Permanent 
Contract  
 DV: Logarithm of 
Annual Wage  
Logarithm of Syrian 
Migrant Population 
  0.0206***  
(0.0023) 
 0.0136***  
(0.0016) 
No. Observations   105,480   101,792 
Centered R-square   0.0148  0.0501 
Informal Sector      
Logarithm of Syrian 
Migrant Population 
  0.0038***  
(0.0009) 
 0.0084***  
(0.0032) 
No. Observations   57,241  50,431 
Centered R-square   0.0084  0.0719 
High Skill DV: Formal 
Employment  
 DV: Permanent 
Contract  
 DV: Logarithm of 
Annual Wage  




 0.0493***  
(0.0021) 
 0.0333***  
(0.0031) 
No. Observations 93,141  73,604  69,609 
Centered R-square 0.2034  0.2892  0.3028 
Low Skill      








 0.0172***  
(0.0015) 
No. Observations 109,032 130 89,117  82,614 
Centered R-square 0.2713 0.6837 0.1130  0.5798 
Wild Bootstrap Combined with Regional-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parenthesis, P-values within brackets, ***, 






Table 10. DID-IV Estimates for Migrants in Turkey Across Groups 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Annual Wage  












No. Observations 411 571 391 563 356 
Centered R-square 0.2017 0.0310 0.0666 0.0236 0.1183 
Female      












No. Observations 131 225 113 459 128 
Centered R-square 0.1468 0.1470 0.1335 0.0231 0.1606 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Annual Wage  












No. Observations 138 181 111 277 102 
Centered R-square 0.1245 0.0219 0.0441 0.0247 0.0998 
Low Education      












No. Observations 404 615 393 745 382 
Centered R-square 0.0597 0.0277 0.2005 0.0324 0.0658 






DV: Labour Force 
Participation  
DV: Logarithm of 
Annual Wage  












No. Observations 218 422 198 553 183 
Centered R-square 0.0380 0.0107 0.1129 0.2361 0.1254 
Age 36-64      












No. Observations 324 374 306 469 301 
Centered R-square 0.2132 0.0371 0.0424 0.0267 0.2298 
Formal Sector   DV: Permanent 
Contract  
 DV: Logarithm of 
Annual Wage  
Logarithm of Syrian 
Migrant Population 
  0.0038  
(0.0043) 
 -0.0710  
(0.0501) 
No. Observations   286  275 
Centered R-square   0.0797  0.0762 
Informal Sector      
Logarithm of Syrian 
Migrant Population 
  -0.0718**  
(0.0309) 
 0.0472  
(0.0508) 
No. Observations   218  209 
Centered R-square   0.1751  0.0523 
High Skill DV: Formal 
Employment  
 DV: Permanent 
Contract  
 DV: Logarithm of 
Annual Wage 




 0.0215  
(0.0323) 
 -0.0539**  
(0.0243) 
No. Observations 174  166  159 
Centered R-square 0.4296  0.8410  0.8410 
Low Skill      




 -0.0578**  
(0.0257) 
 -0.0913**  
(0.0410) 
No. Observations 368  338  325 
Centered R-square 0.6837  0.1751  0.6741 
Wild Bootstrap Combined with Regional-Level Clustered Standard Errors in Parenthesis, P-values within brackets, ***, 
** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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